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REFORMING THE LAW OF  
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 
CHRIS MONTVILLE 
INTRODUCTION 
As the nation continues its shift toward an information economy, 
knowledge becomes an ever more significant asset for American 
employers. Accordingly, the legal rules that control the flow of this 
knowledge between competing firms grow increasingly crucial. These 
rules are understandably important for employers seeking to protect 
themselves from the misappropriation of their knowledge, and 
excessively lax protections could threaten investment in everything 
from new industrial processes to innovative marketing techniques. 
These rules, however, also have a significant impact on the lives 
of employees seeking to use the knowledge and skills they developed 
while at one firm to advance their careers at another. If legal 
protections excessively restrict the mobility of an employee who has 
dedicated years of service to an employer that offers few 
advancement opportunities, the rules have failed in two ways. They 
fail employees by impeding their opportunities for career satisfaction 
and prosperity, and they also fail prospective new employers and the 
economy at large because mobility-restricted employees cannot use 
their accumulated knowledge and skills in the service of the firm that 
will leverage them most efficiently. 
Because striking a balance between these interests is so crucial, 
commentators have expended significant effort in defining the legal 
scope and economic implications of trade secret law, the traditional 
tool for maintaining the secrecy of corporate knowledge.1 Many types 
of information do not qualify for trade secret protection, however, so 
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 1. In contrast, patent law, the other major statutory protection for valuable information, 
requires firms to publicly disclose knowledge as one of its prerequisites for obtaining legal 
protection. 
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firms increasingly turn to a different and far more vaguely defined 
category of protection to limit where employees can go when they 
leave, and what knowledge they may use once they get there.2 This 
category, alternately referred to as proprietary information or 
confidential information, is increasingly invoked in litigation, yet 
academics and courts have made few attempts to define its scope.3 
This Note begins the process of filling this definitional void. Part 
I reviews the two types of legal protections that restrict employee 
knowledge: the widely accepted concept of trade secrets, and the 
emerging category of proprietary information. This Part then 
contrasts trade secrets, a statutorily defined category of information, 
with the broader, contractually based realm of proprietary 
information. 
In Part II this Note introduces the types of information that fall 
under the proprietary information rubric. It then surveys the case law 
in a number of states and outlines the different approaches courts 
take when determining whether knowledge falls under the ambit of 
proprietary information. This survey identifies two general 
approaches to proprietary information under noncompete 
agreements: courts that categorically protect proprietary information, 
and those that require the information be specifically identified and 
then require the employer to show that it is actually proprietary. This 
Part then groups the nondisclosure agreement cases into three 
categories: those that treat nondisclosures as noncompetes, requiring 
a strict showing of reasonableness; those that apply a general rule of 
reason but not the same exacting requirements; and those that 
enforce any nondisclosure agreement, even if unreasonable. In 
addition, Part II identifies several states that, under some 
circumstances, refuse to recognize a concept of propriety information 
at all. 
In Part III, this Note turns to the theoretical justifications for 
proprietary information protections. Considering the two primary 
theoretical justifications for recognizing a distinct category of 
proprietary information—contractual theories and economic 
 
 2. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human 
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 739 (2002) (tracking the continuing 
increase in both trade secret litigation as well as enforcement of noncompetes). 
 3. See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 839, 855 (2005) (observing that the scope of proprietary information is 
“seldom defined”). 
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theories—this Part shows that even if these theories were useful in 
explaining the need for trade secret law, they fail to justify the broad 
additional protections many state courts grant to proprietary 
information. To the contrary, a growing body of scholarship suggests 
that blanket enforcement of contracts restricting proprietary 
information invokes grave fairness concerns while threatening 
economic growth. 
Accordingly, Part IV concludes that although proprietary 
information might require legal recognition in certain circumstances, 
courts should take two steps to limit overenforcement. First, 
enforceable employment agreements should indicate exactly what 
information qualifies as proprietary, and specify precisely how the 
employee will be prohibited from using that information. Second, the 
traditional and well-established restrictions already placed on 
noncompetition agreements should be applied to all restrictive 
covenants in employment contracts—whether traditional 
noncompetes or nondisclosure agreements drafted to protect 
proprietary information that is not also a trade secret. These rules 
would represent a first step toward ameliorating the fairness concerns 
and economic costs of blanket protections for proprietary 
information. Furthermore, as courts evaluate these more specific 
employment contracts, they will be able to develop more cogent rules 
about the types of information that are protectable because cases will 
turn on explicit facts rather than assumptions about employers’ 
intentions and needs. 
I.  THE ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND OF  
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 
Firms control valuable information in several different ways. To 
understand where proprietary information fits in the larger picture, 
first envision a continuum of information. On one end lies entirely 
unprotected information—widely held knowledge such as common 
trade skills or public facts. For this type of information, the law offers 
little protection. On the other end of this spectrum lie trade secrets, 
highly valuable information that is closely protected within a firm. 
These are discussed in Section A.4 
 
 4. These trade secrets are creatures of statute, and protected by the states in a relatively 
uniform and stringent manner. See infra Part I.A. 
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Proprietary information falls somewhere between these two 
extremes. Defined and enforced in employment contracts rather than 
by substantive law, proprietary information encompasses both trade 
secrets as well as knowledge not eligible for trade secret protection. 
Section B discusses the contractual mechanisms that give rise to this 
proprietary information and sketches the basic differences between 
proprietary information and trade secrets. 
A. Trade Secrets: The Inner Bound of Proprietary Information 
Every state protects trade secrets either by statute or under the 
common law, and forty-two5 have enacted statutory protection by 
adopting some variation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws.6 The UTSA defines a trade secret broadly as 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process that 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.7 
Although the subject matter beneath the trade secret umbrella 
appears quite expansive, the UTSA imposes two specific limits on 
trade secrets. First, the protected information must have independent 
economic value resulting from its not being known to (or 
ascertainable by) others.8 Second, and even more crucially, the firm 
asserting protection must undertake a reasonable effort to maintain 
secrecy.9 
 
 5. Michael P. Simpson, Note, Future of Innovation, Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and 
Protectionism—An Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1123 n.8 (2005). 
 6. For a history of trade secret protection in the United States, see Robert G. Bone, A 
New Look at Trade Secret Law: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251–
60 (1998). 
 7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
 8. Id. § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 538. 
 9. Id. § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 538. 
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Every court lends its own gloss to the precise meaning of these 
requirements,10 but the secrecy requirement is uniformly critical—
without secrecy, trade secrets lose their value and, in turn, their legal 
protection.11 Significantly, trade secret protection cannot be applied to 
information that is discernable by proper means or constitutes an 
individual’s personal or professional skills,12 and courts routinely cite 
a number of objective factors to gauge secrecy.13 The secrecy 
requirement thus places the onus on firms to proactively identify and 
protect valuable information. This in turn curtails anticompetitive 
litigation, brought against departing employees based on a purely ex 
post determination that information should have been kept secret. 
For information that meets the trade secret definition, the UTSA 
provides substantial penalties against misappropriation of that 
knowledge. First, the statute bars the transfer of trade secret 
information by any “improper means,” including breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy or the inducement of a breach of that duty.14 The 
statute authorizes the owner of the trade secret to recover monetary 
damages from any party who misappropriates its trade secrets.15 
 
 10. See MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (1999) (“[B]y and large, decisions under 
the various UTSAs will be determined by state courts in accordance with their interpretation of 
the form of the UTSA adopted by that particular state . . . .”). 
 11. See id. § 1.03 (“Indispensable to an effective allegation of a trade secret is proof that 
the matter is, more or less, secret.”). 
 12. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2006) (“Outside the fuzzy line delineating 
protectable trade secrets are . . . categories of unprotectable information [including] . . . that 
which constitutes an individual’s personal or professional skills.”). 
 13. See STEPHAN D. SHANE & WILLIAM J. ROSENTHAL, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK 
§ 15.03[8] (2005) (noting that courts commonly apply these factors both under the common law 
and in UTSA jurisdictions). These factors derive from the Restatement of Torts and include the 
following: 
1. The extent to which the information is known outside the claimant’s business 
2. The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business 
3. The extent of measures taken by the claimant to guard the secrecy of the 
information 
4. The value of the information to the business and its competitors 
5. The amount of effort or money expended by the business in developing the 
information 
6. The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
 14. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)–(2), 14 U.L.A. 537. 
 15. Id. § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 633–34. 
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In addition, if misappropriation or even just the threat of 
misappropriation occurs, the UTSA provides injunctive relief against 
the implicated party.16 This type of relief is particularly significant in 
the employment context, in which workers often transfer jobs after 
being exposed to trade secrets in their former roles. In these 
situations, an injunction will restrict what knowledge employees may 
carry to their future employment. In many states, when coupled with 
a noncompete, trade secret knowledge will prevent employees from 
working for any competing firm at all.17 And in a few states, this may 
occur even without a noncompete: under the controversial doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure,18 departing employees with trade secret 
knowledge may be barred from joining a competing firm based simply 
on the conclusion that they could not realistically perform certain job 
functions without disclosing trade secrets.19 
Perhaps because courts determine trade secrets using objective 
factors rather than by deferring to firms’ own definitions, employers 
hoping to restrict the actions of departing employees often turn to 
contractual protections of confidential, proprietary information. 
 
 16. Id. § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 619. 
 17. For example, trade secrets (and proprietary information) have been the interest 
underlying the enforcement of restrictive covenants in several high-profile cases in the 
technology industry. See, e.g., Tricia Duryee, T-Mobile ex-COO Barred from Job, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at E1 (preliminary injunction issued against a former executive who had 
“been exposed to . . . sensitive, proprietary, confidential and trade secret information” and took 
employment in the same industry but another state); Verne Kopytoff, Google Settles Hiring Suit; 
Ex-Microsoft Exec to Work in China, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 2005, at C1 (describing the 
settlement of a suit against a former Microsoft executive who took a position at Google in China 
after the trial court issued a preliminary injunction). 
 18. Although the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Pepsi Co. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 
1995), may be the most prominent instance of a court adopting this doctrine, a number of states 
follow it to some degree. See Eleanor R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: 
Employee Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 167 (2004) (“Some states 
clearly subscribe to the doctrine, others apply a restricted version of the doctrine, and others 
reject the doctrine entirely.”). 
 19. The interaction between employment contracts and trade secrets is somewhat circular. 
Whereas the existence of a trade secret may support the enforceability of a noncompete, the 
creation of a nondisclosure agreement (often coupled with a noncompete) is among the efforts 
to maintain secrecy that courts consider when deciding if information rises to the level of a trade 
secret in the first place. See EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK § 18:2.1[B][1] (Timothy J. Long 
ed., 2005) (“One step that employers should take to protect the trade secret status of their 
confidential information is to require that employees and third parties who are given access to 
the information sign confidentiality agreements.”). 
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B. The Definition and Mechanics of Proprietary Information 
The concept of proprietary information derives, as an initial 
matter, from that term’s frequent usage in employment contracts, in 
the form of nondisclosure and noncompete agreements. Courts 
struggle to precisely define “proprietary information,” but the 
American Law Institute (ALI) has attempted to develop a succinct 
definition as part of the Draft Third Restatement of Employment Law 
(Draft Restatement). This Section first considers what proprietary 
information might be, contrasting the Draft Restatement definition 
with the UTSA definition of trade secrets, and then turns to 
examining how firms protect this information through employment 
contracts. 
1. Defining Proprietary Information.  Although not the law nor 
even yet adopted by the ALI, the Draft Restatement provides a useful 
starting point for a deeper survey of the case law. Section 6.01 
provides that 
[a]n employer’s proprietary information is commercially valuable 
information that the employer has developed or obtained and taken 
reasonable measures to keep confidential. It does not include 
information that is generally known, derived from general training 
offered by the employer, or is readily ascertainable by proper 
means.20 
The contrast between the ALI’s approach to proprietary information 
and the UTSA’s definition of trade secrets reveals key distinctions 
between the two categories. The first factor involves the value of the 
information. Trade secrets gain value by virtue of their secrecy—by 
being “not being generally known to” competitors.21 True trade 
secrets lose their value if discovered by others. Proprietary 
information, meanwhile, needs only some degree of commercial 
value, and that value need not be diminished by discovery.22 The 
second factor, somewhat recursively defined for both categories, 
requires reasonable efforts by the firm to either keep the information 
secret (for trade secrets) or confidential (for proprietary 
information). The third factor, involving the subject matter of the 
 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 538. 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01. 
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protected knowledge, is the most distinguishing. Trade secrets are 
positively and narrowly defined as a “formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process.”23 Proprietary 
information, on the other hand, may be anything that is not generally 
known or ascertainable by proper means.24 This suggests a much 
broader and open-ended scope to proprietary information. 
Like the Draft Restatement, some courts explicitly recognize 
proprietary information as a separate class of knowledge lying 
between trade secrets and entirely unprotected information.25 One 
state, Florida, even explicitly protects proprietary information by 
statute, independent of its status as a trade secret.26 Most courts, 
however, recognize proprietary and confidential information more 
implicitly, by upholding restrictions against its dissemination without 
acknowledging it as specifically protectable and relying on the 
definitions provided in the specific employment agreements. 
2. The Contractual Underpinnings of Proprietary Information.  
Although the Draft Restatement does not explicitly state as much, 
most jurisdictions protect proprietary information only with contract 
law. The section 6.01 comments assert that an employer may meet the 
reasonable measures to maintain confidentially requirement by 
“impress[ing] on employees the need for confidentiality,” and by 
“ask[ing] employees contractually to agree not to disclose 
confidential information.”27 In most jurisdictions, however, such a 
contract is not simply a factor in establishing information as 
proprietary, but it is the legal foundation for actions to enforce its 
protection.28 
 
 23. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01. 
 25. See, e.g., Richards Mfg. Co. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., Civ. No. 01-4677, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22479, at *15 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2005) (adopting the view that New Jersey recognizes 
three categories of valuable information); Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co., 549 N.E.2d 793, 796 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (disagreeing with the defendant’s suggestion “that only trade secrets—as 
distinct from confidential information—are entitled to legal protection”); Revere Transducers, 
Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 765 & n.2 (Iowa 1999) (holding that a plaintiff need not 
prove that confidential information rises to the level of a trade secret to gain protection). 
 26. In Florida, “[v]aluable confidential business or professional information that otherwise 
does not qualify as trade secrets” is explicitly protectable. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(b)2 
(West 2002). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.01 cmt. b. 
 28. See Robert Unikel, Bridging the Trade Secret Gap: Protecting “Confidential 
Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 855–67 (1998) 
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These contracts include restrictive covenants in two forms: 
nondisclosures (or confidentiality agreements) and noncompetes (or 
noncompetition agreements). Nondisclosures, the more direct of the 
two devices, simply forbid employees from revealing proprietary 
information outside the firm, either during or following their 
employment. Generally, nondisclosure agreements appear to be 
widely enforced.29 
Noncompete agreements, meanwhile, protect proprietary 
information indirectly. To understand how proprietary information 
supports these agreements, it is helpful to first consider these 
agreements generally. Noncompete agreements restrict employees 
from working at competing firms, usually within a certain geographic 
area and only for a certain length of time. Courts view these 
agreements as restraints on trade,30 and, although each state has its 
own criteria for enforcing them, most31 apply some variation of the 
“rule of reason” found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.32 
Under the rule, noncompetes may be unreasonable, and thus 
unenforceable, for one of two reasons. First, the restraint may contain 
restrictions “greater than needed to protect the [employer’s] 
legitimate interest.”33 In proprietary information cases, a company’s 
desire to control its proprietary information comprises this legitimate 
business interest. As the Restatement notes, however, it is often 
unclear what qualifies as a legitimate business interest.34 
Second, a restraint is also unreasonable if the employer’s need 
“is outweighed by the hardship to the [employee] and the likely injury 
to the public.”35 The extent of the restraint is key to the 
 
(“Express contracts, whether in the form of covenants not to compete or non-
disclosure/confidentiality agreements, are perhaps the most frequently employed devices for the 
protection of proprietary information.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 29. M. Scott McDonald, Compete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of Unpredictability, 10 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 149 (2003). 
 30. T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 1, 3 n.11 (2005) (“These types of covenants have traditionally been regarded by the 
common law as ‘restraints of trade.’”). 
 31. Alice J. Baker, Legislative Prohibitions on the Enforcement of Post-Employment 
Covenants Not to Compete in the Broadcasting Industry, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 647, 
651 (2001) (noting that most states adhere to the limits on noncompetion agreements set forth in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts). 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a (1981). 
 33. Id. § 188(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. § 188 cmt. b. 
 35. Id. § 188(1)(b). 
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reasonableness determination: the wider the geographic area 
implicated, the longer the restriction’s duration, or the broader the 
realm of competitive activity curtailed, the more likely a court will be 
to find the agreement unreasonable.36 Additionally, when the 
legitimate business interest is information, the nature of that 
information should form a crucial component of the reasonableness 
analysis.37 
In practice, nondisclosure clauses are frequently tied to 
noncompetion agreements38 and the choice of analytical framework 
may be less than obvious. Furthermore, unless the facts of a specific 
case delineate the subject matter of the proprietary information claim 
with unusual rigor, a vague nondisclosure agreement coupled with an 
injunctive remedy will have the same effect as a noncompete 
agreement—a broad restriction of employee mobility. 
The underlying cause of action in proprietary information cases 
will depend both on the former employee’s role and the target of the 
litigation. When a firm targets a former employee, it generally sues on 
a theory of express breach of contract.39 If the former employee is an 
officer of the firm, a breach of fiduciary duty theory also applies.40 
When the firm targets the new employer, rather than the individual 
employee, it may use a theory of tortious interference with contract 
instead.41 
 
 36. Id. § 188 cmt. d. 
 37. Comment g suggests that courts engage in a complex, case-by-case evaluation of 
whether the public interest is served by the restriction: 
Whether the risk that the employee may do injury to the employer is sufficient to 
justify a promise to refrain from competition after the termination of the employment 
will depend on the facts of the particular case. . . . A line must be drawn between the 
general skills and knowledge of the trade and information that is peculiar to the 
employer’s business. If the employer seeks to justify the restraint on the ground of the 
employee’s knowledge of a process or method, the confidentiality of that process or 
method and its technological life may be critical. The public interest in workable 
employer-employee relationships with an efficient use of employees must be balanced 
against the interest in individual economic freedom. The court will take account of 
any diminution in competition likely to result from slowing down the dissemination of 
ideas and of any impairment of the function of the market in shifting manpower to 
areas of greatest productivity. 
Id. § 188 cmt. g. 
 38. See, e.g., Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1161–62 (N.J. 2000) 
(analyzing an employment agreement involving a nondisclosure agreement as the justification 
for a twelve-month restrictive covenant). 
 39. Unikel, supra note 28, at 855–57. For a comprehensive summary of the legal theories 
used to protect “confidential information,” see id. at 854–67. 
 40. Id. at 859–62. 
 41. Id. at 862–65. 
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These frameworks for protecting proprietary information are 
fairly well established and help explain the how of proprietary 
information. The ALI’s definition and a comparison with trade 
secrets begin to define the scope of proprietary information, but they 
tell little about what types of information courts actually protect and 
when that information qualifies as proprietary. A survey of the case 
law sheds some light on this question. 
II.  ENFORCING CONTRACTS RESTRICTING PROPRIETARY 
INFORMATION: A SUMMARY OF THE CASE LAW 
An attempt to survey and categorize the case law surrounding 
proprietary information must consider two primary questions. First, 
what types of information do courts protect, and second, when do 
they protect it. In response to the first question, the cases indicate 
that courts will construe proprietary information to protect nearly 
anything that is not widely held common knowledge.42 Some types of 
information receive more protection than others, however, and 
Section A reviews the types of proprietary information most 
frequently at issue in employment litigation. 
The second question—when do courts protect proprietary 
information—is more difficult to answer. Even within a single state, 
courts may take contradictory approaches to similar facts. 
Accordingly, the proffered categories represent some generalizations 
about how courts in different states handle these cases, but as this 
Part shows, important differences do exist between the approaches 
taken by different states. 
Section B looks at judicial approaches to proprietary information 
under noncompete agreements, concluding that courts fall into two 
broad groups: courts that apply a categorical approach, enforcing 
contracts because certain types of information appear formally 
implicated by the contract, and courts that apply a factual approach, 
requiring that employers identify precisely what information is 
 
 42. To further complicate matters, even in individual decisions courts often fail to identify 
precisely what subject matter falls under “proprietary information.” In one egregious (but not 
atypical) example, a court covered everything from “knowledge” and “materials” to “know-
how,” “marketing,” and “business plans” all within a single injunction. Speech Works Int’l, Inc. 
v. Cote, No. 02-4411, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 390, at *14–15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2002); 
see also QSP, Inc. v. Hair, 566 S.E.2d 851, 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (protecting “accounts, 
business practices, and know-how”); Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 77, 78 
(Cir. Ct. 2003) (protecting “customer lists, rate structures, manuals, reports, proprietary 
programs and charges for services”). 
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proprietary and show that the employee actually possesses the 
information. 
Section C then considers the nondisclosure agreement cases. 
Here, courts fall into three categories: (1) those that apply the same 
the rules to nondisclosures as noncompete agreements, (2) those that 
apply the general noncompete-agreement “rule of reason” but not its 
more exacting requirements, and (3) those that place no 
reasonableness restraints on noncompetes. 
Finally, Section D considers two circumstances under which 
proprietary information becomes enveloped by trade secrets: first, 
when courts (such as California) conclude that the law and public 
policy counsel against enforcing protections for non-trade-secret 
information, and second, when the UTSA preempts a claim for 
tortious interference with contract. 
A. The Subject Matter of Proprietary Information 
The types of subject matter implicated in proprietary information 
cases are expansive, but some types appear with greater frequency 
than others. Perhaps most frequently at issue are customer lists and 
information about customers.43 Although many courts will protect 
customer information outright,44 because competitors can frequently 
 
 43. See Stone, supra note 2, at 748 (“[C]ustomer information is the most commonly 
litigated trade secret issue.”). Some courts explicitly identify customer or client information as a 
legitimate business interest to be protected by restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Unger v. FFW 
Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (protecting customer lists because the bank 
demonstrated a legitimate protectable interest in business goodwill and “the confidentiality of 
client lists are part of that [goodwill]”). Other states adopt the view that restrictions on such 
information are generally restraints of trade and against public policy. See, e.g., Unisource 
Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara, 244 F. Supp. 2d 977, 986 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“Illinois case law provides 
that a distributor has no proprietary interest in information belonging to the customer . . . .”); 
Citadel Broad. Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C.4th 534, 551 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) (“The names of . . . 
customers . . . are likewise not considered confidential or proprietary information under 
Pennsylvania law.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Owens v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(protecting “confidential business information, including customer lists” of insurance policy 
holders); Del. Express Shuttle, Inc. v. Older, C.A. No. 19596, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *76 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002) (protecting “customer list or related information”); Modis, Inc. v. 
Revolution Group, Ltd., No. 99-1104, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 542, at *21 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 29, 1999) (protecting a technology staffing firm’s confidential knowledge of “which 
employers needed technical support help”). But see Clarion Assocs., Inc. v. D.J. Colby Co., No. 
1998-23085, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 274, at *15–16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 1999) (concluding 
that “the defendant should not be enjoined from direct solicitation of individual potential 
customers if the names of such individuals are obtained from sources wholly independent of [his 
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ascertain an employer’s customer lists from public sources and 
perhaps because of a reluctance to support direct restraints of trade, 
some courts single out some special information about the 
customers,45 such as contract expiration dates46 or the customers’ 
specific requirements47 as the basis for protection. Illinois, meanwhile, 
follows another route, protecting only “near-permanent” customer 
relationships.48 
The oft-invoked rubric of “business knowledge” also covers a 
large area of proprietary information. Under this heading, courts 
frequently enjoin departing employees having knowledge of cost 
information and pricing formulas.49 Proof of actual use of the 
information by the departed employee is sometimes required,50 but in 
the case of pricing data, simply consistently underpricing the 
employee’s former firm has been a sufficient foundation for an 
injunction.51 Marketing strategies are also protected,52 even when 
 
former employer’s] book of business or expirations”), appeal dismissed, 714 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. 
Div. 2000). 
 45. Perhaps for similar reasons, some courts sidestep the entire problem of publicly-
ascertainable “proprietary information” by identifying the business goodwill associated with 
ongoing customer relationships or even the relationships themselves rather than the 
confidentiality of the information as the basis for upholding restrictive covenants. See, e.g., 
Millard Maint. Serv. Co. v. Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“In Illinois, an 
employer has a protectable interest in its customers . . . where, by the nature of the business, 
[the] employer has a near-permanent relationship with its customers . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)); Unger, 771 N.E.2d at 1244 (maintaining the confidentiality of customer lists bolstered 
bank’s goodwill by establishing its reputation for trustworthiness). 
 46. Stratco Wireless, LLC v. Sw. Bell Wireless, LLC, 95 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 47. See, e.g., Donald McElroy, Inc. v. Delaney, 389 N.E.2d 1300, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) 
(stating that employers may protect themselves against disadvantageous use of information 
acquired through “representative contact”). 
 48. See Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co., 549 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“[A]n 
employer’s interest in his customers is adequate for enforcing a covenant not to compete . . . 
where, by the nature of the business, plaintiff has a near-permanent relationship with its 
customers and but for his or her employment, defendant would not have had contact with 
them . . . .”). 
 49. See, e.g., Millard, 566 N.E.2d at 385 (rejecting the notion that a “pricing formula must 
be a trade secret in order to merit legal protection”); Donald McElroy, Inc., 389 N.E.2d at 1304–
05, 1306 (stating that “[an] employer has the right to protect himself from the disadvantageous 
use” of a pricing formula, which testimony indicated was based on “well known principles”). 
 50. See Citadel Broad. Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C.4th 543, 551 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) 
(declining to enjoin the solicitation of a former employer’s customers when the employer “has 
not established that [employee] is utilizing any such data in attempting to attract advertising 
accounts”). 
 51. See Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Valenti, 196 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“While the precise way in which Matrix obtained the information remains murky, it is clear to 
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aspects such as advertising methods and the choice of which goods to 
sell are publicly ascertainable.53 
Although trade secret law remains the preferred tool for 
protecting technical information,54 courts will also protect quasi-
technical subject matter under the proprietary information umbrella, 
without engaging in the analysis of whether the information qualifies 
as a trade secret.55 Finally, business methods are also widely 
protectable as proprietary information.56 
As this brief survey suggests, courts place few subject matter 
limits on the information that may qualify as proprietary. They do, 
however, apply the tests associated with the contractual mechanisms 
used to protect the proprietary information, generally either a 
noncompete or nondisclosure agreement. 
 
the court that every customer serviced by Matrix is a former customer of Unisource and that all 
of Matrix’s pricing is the same as or better than Unisource’s.”). 
 52. See Open Magnetic Imaging, Inc. v. Nieves-Garcia, 826 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002) (finding that a database of area physicians comprised a protectable business interest 
as a “strategic marketing plan”); Platinum Mgmt., Inc. v. Dahms, 666 A.2d 1028, 1038, 1041 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (enforcing a covenant intended, in part, to protect “customers’ 
buying habits, PMI’s [price] mark-up structure, merchandising plans, sales projections and 
product strategies”). 
 53. Cf. United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
189, at *15–16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2003) (finding that a competing rug distributor engaged 
in tortious interference and misappropriation of confidential information for hiring the 
competitor’s departing employees and selling the same variety of rugs in the same areas). 
 54. See Bone, supra note 6, at 248 (“While most cases involve technological subject 
matter . . . almost anything can qualify as a trade secret . . . .”). 
 55. See, e.g., Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 02-1169, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
248, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 9, 2003) (protecting, inter alia, recipes for coffee and baked 
goods), aff’d, 815 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 2004); Simplified TeleSys, Inc. v. Live Oak Telecom, 
L.L.C., 68 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding that computer software development 
techniques were protectable by confidentiality agreement despite the fact that “the technical 
details of that ‘method’ are not found in the record save in the broadest or most general 
terms”). 
 56. For example, in Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), a district court applying New York law enjoined a departed employee of a patent 
consulting company from creating a competing firm because he signed a nondisclosure 
agreement, despite a lack of evidence that the employee actually incorporated any of Markovits’ 
proprietary methodologies—“combin[ing] works from the public domain”—into his new 
business, id. at 655–56. The court instead focused extensively on the similarity between the two 
companies’ business models and the fact that they were direct competitors. Id. at 656. As in so 
many proprietary information cases, the knowledge itself played a secondary role as legal 
justification for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant; the court assumed that because the 
employee built on his experience by entering the same market as his former employer, he had 
necessarily stolen proprietary information. Id. 
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B. Proprietary Information under Noncompete Agreements 
A noncompete agreement’s enforceability turns on whether or 
not it protects a legitimate business interest.57 As noted in Part I, the 
definition of a legitimate business interest is often quite vague, and 
leaves courts with significant flexibility to fashion general rules. When 
employers proffer proprietary information as their protectable 
business interest, courts may either adopt a categorical approach, 
looking to the language of the contract and the general type of 
information protected to determine enforceability, or engage in a 
more searching factual inquiry, requiring specificity and a showing 
that nonenforcement would present an actual harm to the employer. 
1. Categorical Enforcement: Broad Protection for Proprietary 
Information.  Courts in many states take a casual approach to 
enforcing noncompete agreements protecting proprietary 
information, focusing generally on an employer’s invocation of a 
broad category of supposedly proprietary information and the degree 
of potential harm that might result from competition by the former 
employee. These courts focus most strongly on whether the former 
employee might cause economic damage to his former employer, 
even when that damage may arise simply from ordinary competition. 
The alleged importance of the proprietary information to the 
employer’s business thus comprises the key attribute of the cases 
applying the categorical protection approach. The exact nature of the 
alleged proprietary information, meanwhile, plays a secondary role in 
these cases. In these jurisdictions, employers may simply identify 
general categories without introducing a specific example of the 
contested information to the court.58 Consequently, physical 
 
 57. See EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK, supra note 19, § 18.3.2[A] (“As a threshold 
matter, courts require an employer to have a ‘legitimate interest’ before they will enforce a 
covenant not to compete.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Boch Toyota, Inc. v. Klimoski, No. 04-966, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 258, at 
*9–11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2004) (protecting “confidential or proprietary business 
information” without specifying exactly what that information might be); EMC Corp. v. Allen, 
No. 97-5972-B, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 102, at *3–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1997) 
(enjoining a former EMC officer from working at Sun Microsystems because of his exposure to 
“confidential and proprietary” information such as product development strategies and 
marketing plans, apparently without requiring EMC to demonstrate any efforts to keep this 
information secret). This is not to suggest that all Massachusetts cases are so vague. See 
Boulanger, 2003 Mass. Super LEXIS 248, at *7 (stating that “so long as the restrictions do not 
surpass the bounds of reasonableness, there is no reason to take a narrow view of what is 
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misappropriation is unnecessary; “the employee may still be enjoined 
if the appropriated confidential information is merely in his or her 
memory.”59 
Often, this broad category involves information about customer 
requirements and customer information.60 Courts applying this 
permissive approach show great deference to these relationships, and 
less concern for promoting competition or protecting employee 
mobility. One court went so far as to call customer information the 
“essence” of a plaintiff’s temporary-staffing business—despite the fact 
that the employer’s customers were well known and that the 
customers would presumably share this information openly with any 
staffing firm they hired.61 Courts may be particularly inclined to 
enforce these noncompetes when they include nonsolicitation clauses, 
because in many jurisdictions customer goodwill embodies a 
legitimate business interest separate from proprietary information 
and may support a noncompete agreement on its own. Inexact 
judicial language, however, often blurs the lines between goodwill 
and proprietary information, making it difficult to surmise if these 
cases are truly proprietary information cases or goodwill cases.62 
Other vague categories of information qualify for protection 
under the categorical approach as well, and not all cases even require 
that the information result from any sort of investment. For example, 
knowledge of the “strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s products” 
supported a noncompete agreement when “the loss of even a single 
contract could deprive [the former employer] of revenue for many 
years.”63 
While placing a detailed focus on the potential harm to the 
employer (for example, in terms of lost customers), courts give 
minimal consideration to the precise nature of the proprietary 
 
confidential,” but noting that the former employer had identified specific items of proprietary 
information and had taken steps to keep them confidential). 
 59. See Boch, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 258, at *9 (“Whether an employee actually takes 
any customer or supplier lists with him is not dispositive . . . .”). 
 60. See supra Part II.A. 
 61. Modis, Inc. v. Revolution Group, Ltd., No. 99-1104, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 542, at 
*21 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1999). 
 62. See, e.g., Cohoon v. Fin. Plans & Strategies, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001) (stating that “an employer is entitled to contract to protect the good will of the business,” 
but stating that “secret or confidential information” is an element of this goodwill). For an 
example of how this confusion leads to inconsistent legal rules, see infra note 99 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. Sys. & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 886 A.2d 762, 765 (Vt. 2005). 
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information (as opposed to the ordinary competition) that supposedly 
led to this harm.64 Accordingly, because the exact information 
remains unidentified, a court cannot even begin to query whether it 
actually rises to the level of propriety. Even when some specific 
proprietary information has been identified, however, courts in this 
group fail to engage in these inquiries. 
For example, they often do not require employers to prove the 
information has been kept confidential. This occurs most frequently 
in Massachusetts cases,65 although courts in other jurisdictions are 
equally willing to gloss over the requirement that proprietary 
information actually be proprietary.66 Some courts will take a middle 
ground, requiring a minimal showing that the employer made some 
effort to indicate the documents’ confidentiality, but this effort may 
be as trivial as stamping a single document with the word 
“confidential,” and may support a preliminary injunction even in the 
 
 64. See, e.g., Owens v. Penn Life Mut. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(enforcing a noncompete agreement under Arkansas law because the employer lost sixty 
accounts to its former employee, but only generally stating, without support, that the defendant 
was given “special training” and “was privy to confidential business information”); Unisource 
Worldwide, Inc. v. Valenti, 196 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying New York law 
to enforce a covenant to prevent the release of confidential information based on broadly-
defined categories of information and because “it is clear to the court that every customer 
serviced by the [defendant’s new employer] is a former customer of [the plaintiff] and that all of 
[the defendant’s employer’s] pricing is the same as or better than [the plaintiff’s]”); QSP, Inc. v. 
Hair, 566 S.E.2d 851, 853–854 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (enjoining a chocolate salesperson from 
competing based on evidence that he had solicited the plaintiff’s clients, rather than on evidence 
that the proprietary “information concerning . . . accounts, business practices, and know-how” 
was either actually confidential, or actually used by the defendant). 
 65. See, e.g., Boch Toyota, Inc. v. Klimoski, No. 04-966, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 258, *10–
12 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2004) (protecting employer information without any reference to a 
prior safeguarding of its confidentiality); Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 02-1169, 2003 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 248, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 9, 2003) (“[T]he fact that a company has 
not done all that it possibly could have done to guard the secrecy of the information is not 
necessarily fatal to its defense of the restrictive clauses.”), aff’d, 815 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 2004). 
 66. See, e.g., Open Magnetic Imaging, Inc. v. Nieves-Garcia, 826 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a marketing database supported a noncompete agreement, but not 
citing to any evidence that the database was confidential); Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770 
A.2d 1158, 1160–61 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting a trial court’s conclusion that the determination of 
whether information was confidential or proprietary required a factual inquiry, and instead 
granting summary judgment). Although many states approach proprietary information in 
inconsistent ways, New Jersey may be among the worst offenders. See infra note 75 and 
accompanying text (discussing a New Jersey federal court’s conclusion that New Jersey law 
requires a searching four-factor inquiry into the proprietary information of employer 
information). 
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face of highly conflicting evidence suggesting that the employer failed 
to protect the entire asserted category of information.67 
Nor do courts employing the categorical approach generally 
require plaintiffs to show that outsiders cannot easily recreate the 
asserted proprietary information.68 Sometimes courts will even reach 
this conclusion explicitly, first finding that the publicly ascertainable 
aspects of the proprietary information remove them from the ambit 
of trade secret protection, but then proceeding to enforce a 
noncompete agreement protecting the very same public information.69 
These courts also apply a wide presumption that if employees 
could theoretically use the proprietary information in their new 
employments, they necessarily will.70 Consequently, they rarely 
conduct any fact-specific inquiry into the question whether 
irreparable harm has been demonstrated. As an Indiana court 
reasoned, “[w]hen a covenant not to compete of this nature is 
breached, it follows that the employer will suffer harm,”71 despite the 
lack of any showing that such harm would actually occur or that the 
employee had actually taken any confidential information. 
The categorical approach permits firms to create vague 
noncompetes, broadly protecting “proprietary information” or 
subsets thereof, and then enjoin employees based on whatever 
knowledge they happen to obtain—no matter how nonsecretive or 
 
 67. McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs., L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999). 
 68. See, e.g., Unisource Worldwide, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 277–78 (rejecting defendant’s 
contention that information “readily ascertainable outside the employer’s business” cannot be 
protected by a restricted covenant). 
 69. See Del. Express Shuttle, Inc. v. Older, C.A. No. 19596, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at 
*73, *76–78 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002) (finding publicly ascertainable customers lists are not a 
trade secret, but nonetheless enforcing a noncompete agreement based on the proprietary 
nature of those same customer lists). 
 70. See, e.g., Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 297 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[T]he harm 
to [the employer] cannot be avoided simply by the former employee’s intention not to disclose 
information . . . . [H]e does not go with a tabula rasa with respect to [the former employer’s 
proprietary information] . . . .”); Statco Wireless, LLC v. Sw. Bell Wireless, LLC, 95 S.W.3d 13, 
19 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he fact that [it would be possible for an agent to sell for a 
competitor without disclosing confidential information] does not necessarily prevent 
enforcement of the covenant. The question is whether [the defendant] would be able to use the 
information obtained to gain an unfair competitive advantage.”); Neff Motivation, Inc. v. 
Largrou, 2002-Ohio-2788U, at ¶ 66 (Ct. App. June 7, 2002) (enforcing noncompete because 
defendant salesperson’s “knowledge and experience” with customers “would give him a distinct 
advantage over [plaintiff’s] replacement salesman, one that otherwise cannot be avoided”). 
 71. McGlothen, 705 N.E.2d at 1074. 
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nonspecific—during the performance of their job duties. In these 
jurisdictions, employee mobility comes second to the unsubstantiated 
interests of a former employer, often indistinguishable from ordinary 
competition. 
2. The Specificity Approach: Requiring Employers to Show 
What They’re Protecting—And Why.  Not every court employs such a 
casual approach, however. Courts in a number of states often require 
employers to meet several criteria before enforcing noncompete 
agreements based on proprietary information. Most frequently, they 
require employers to (1) draft contracts narrowly and specifically, 
identifying the precise proprietary information supporting the 
agreement; (2) prove that this allegedly proprietary information is 
confidential and at least somewhat unique to the plaintiff firm; (3) 
demonstrate that the former employee possesses the proprietary 
information and will actually use it to compete; and (4) show that the 
former employer will actually suffer irreparable harm as a result. 
Each of these fact-specific inquiries necessarily turns on the 
presence of the first: without a clear idea of what proprietary 
information the employer lays claim to, employees are hard-pressed 
to know what they are relinquishing. Courts, likewise, are hard-
pressed to evaluate whether this claim adequately supports a 
noncompete agreement.72 Consequently, some courts require that 
noncompete agreements identify the specific information protected 
and that protection of this information be reasonably narrow.73 For 
 
 72. See WebMD Health Corp. v. Martin, No. 601654-06, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS. at 24–30 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2006) (applying Delaware law to reject the plaintiffs’ contention that 
“Delaware law requires them only to demonstrate the ‘nature’ of the confidential information, 
and not to ‘actually share the secret information’” with the court, and consequently refusing to 
issue a preliminary injunction enforcing a noncompete agreement). 
 73. See, e.g., Serv. Ctrs. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) 
(finding a confidentiality agreement “defining confidential information as essentially all the 
information provided by [the plaintiff] to [the defendant] ‘concerning or in any way relating’ to 
the services offered by [the defendant]” to be unreasonably broad); TGR Enters., Inc. v. 
Kozhev, 167 Ohio App. 3d 29, 2006-Ohio-2915, 853 N.E.2d 739, at ¶ 31 (“The fact that the 
covenants . . . were written so broadly does not establish that [the defendants] were necessarily 
using or revealing . . . protected information. However, the breadth of the covenants does call 
into question whether the covenants are reasonable and enforceable . . . .”); see also Richards 
Mfg. Co. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., Civ. No. 01-4677, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *19 
(D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2005) (describing New Jersey’s four-factor test for proprietary information, 
including whether the information is “specific and ‘highly specialized’” (quoting Ingersoll-Rand 
v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609, 638 (1988))). 
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some types of information, physical misappropriation may even be 
required.74 
In cases where the employer does identify proprietary 
information specifically, courts will then often require some evidence 
that the proprietary information is actually proprietary to the firm as 
well as, to some degree, confidential. In New Jersey, for example, 
“[f]ailure to maintain the purportedly confidential information in a 
secretive manner [weighs] against a finding of a protectable 
interest.”75 So too would a finding that the information is not unique; 
“if purportedly confidential information, or substantially similar 
information, exists within a competitor’s facility, it would likely not be 
protected.”76 
In some states, the employer must also demonstrate that the 
former employee possesses and has actually used the proprietary 
information. In these cases, simply showing that the defendant 
competed with a former employer fails to support an injunction 
enforcing a noncompete agreement; actual proof of damage resulting 
 
 74. See Citadel Broad. Co. v. Gratz, 52 Pa. D. & C.4th 534, 551 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) (“The 
names of . . . customers which [the defendant] has retained via her memory are likewise not 
considered confidential or proprietary information under Pennsylvania law.”). 
 75. Richards Mfg., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *19; see Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co., 
549 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding “it difficult to ascertain from the record what, 
exactly was confidential about [the former employer’s] pricing formula” and concluding that the 
information thus “falls short of being a protectable business interest entitled to injunctive 
relief”); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 684 (Tex. 1990) (“[W]hile confidential 
information may be protected by an agreement not to compete, Wackenhut has failed to show 
that it needed such protection . . . . Wackenhut failed to show that its customers could not 
readily be identified by someone outside its employ . . . or that its customers’ needs could not be 
ascertained simply by inquiry addressed to those customers themselves.”). 
Of course this more-exacting confidentiality analysis may still lead to enforcement of a 
noncompete agreement when the plaintiff-employer meets the criteria. See, e.g., Statco Wireless, 
95 S.W.3d at 19 (enforcing a noncompete agreement when the former employer “was very 
careful about who it provided customer lists to; and it had a policy to retrieve confidential 
information from terminated agents”). 
 76. Richards Mfg., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *18. New Jersey courts also consider 
whether the information is “current.” Id. at *21; see also A Place for Mom, Inc. v. Leonhardt, 
No. C06-457P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58990, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2006) (holding a 
noncompete agreement enforceable “only insofar as [the employer] can prove that [its former 
employee] has unfairly availed himself of information that is uniquely proprietary and available 
only to . . . employees” (emphasis added)); Citadel Broad. Co., 52 Pa. D & C.4th at 551 (denying 
a preliminary injunction to enforce a noncompete agreement because the supposed proprietary 
information was “generally known or available throughout the radio broadcasting business”); 
DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684 (“Also, Wackenhut failed to show that its pricing policies and 
bidding strategies were uniquely developed, or that information about its prices and bids could 
not, again, be obtained from the customers themselves.”). 
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from the proprietary information is required.77 In Texas, courts also 
impose an adequate-consideration requirement that the exchange of 
proprietary information be either contemporaneous with the signing 
of a noncompete agreement, or that the employer be contractually 
bound to provide this information in the future.78 This inquiry 
necessarily requires the plaintiff to specifically identify the exact 
proprietary information protected. 
Although the factual inquiries undertaken by the courts 
following this general approach vary, they each begin by requiring 
employers to specifically identify the alleged proprietary information. 
As Part IV argues, this basic step alleviates many of the economic and 
fairness concerns associated with proprietary information as a 
noncompete-agreement-supporting “legitimate business interest.” 
Fundamentally, this approach recognizes that employers may invoke 
proprietary information as a way to restrict competition by impeding 
the mobility of their employees in the face of public policy limits on 
general noncompetes. If the information is not actually proprietary, 
or competitors may obtain it legally and easily, these courts 
reasonably conclude that impeding competition—not the flow of 
proprietary information—is the true purpose of these contracts. 
C. Proprietary Information under Nondisclosure Agreements 
When courts consider the reasonableness of proprietary 
information under nondisclosure agreements, in some respects the 
inquiry varies in the same ways as under noncompete agreements. 
Some courts will allow employers to define proprietary information 
quite broadly, enforcing virtually anything that might be a “logical 
 
 77. See A Place for Mom, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58990, at *9 (granting only a limited 
injunction because “[p]laintiff has yet to produce any evidence that [d]efendant is using 
information which is only available through their proprietary database to compete with them”). 
 78. This is because, in Texas, at-will employment is not sufficient consideration to bind a 
noncompete agreement; rather, there must be a contemporaneous exchange of confidential or 
proprietary information to support the agreement, or a promise to provide such information. 
Morse Wholesale Paper Co. v. Talley, No. 14-05-01180-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7196, at *6–
7 (Tex. App. Apr. 18, 2006); see also Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143 
S.W.3d 452, 460–61 (Tex. App. 2004) (finding a noncompete agreement unilateral and 
unenforceable because the plaintiff “could have avoided its ‘promise’ . . . to provide information 
and training to [the employee] by terminating [the employee’s] at-will employment 
relationship”); Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(upholding a noncompete when a noncompete agreement “obligated [the employer] to provide 
confidential information and training and the record establishes it did so”). 
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area[] of concern for the employer.”79 Most that engage in the 
analysis, however, are at least somewhat more exacting. 
A less subtle doctrinal rift informs whether courts even reach this 
analysis in the first place, however. This rift exists between courts that 
apply the same “rule of reason,”80 requiring geographic and temporal 
reasonableness, to nondisclosure agreements as well as noncompetes, 
and those that either apply a watered-down version of the rule or 
hold it to be entirely inapplicable. Each approach represents a 
fundamentally different view of how nondisclosure agreements affect 
employees and competition. 
1. Treating Nondisclosure Agreements as Noncompete 
Agreements.  In some jurisdictions, courts treat nondisclosure 
agreements that restrict former employees after their employment in 
the same manner as they would a noncompete agreement with the 
same purpose. Some of these courts do so without referencing the 
noncompete agreement rules directly, instead establishing similar 
rules that apply specifically to nondisclosure agreements.81 Others 
make the analogy more explicit, reasoning that, as restraints of trade, 
noncompetition clauses must be construed against the employer and 
invalidated if the broadest possible reading renders them 
unenforceable.82 
In almost all of these jurisdictions, the basic inquiries about 
proprietary information that apply to noncompete agreements83 
resurface. Courts impose specificity requirements,84 many inquire into 
 
 79. Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 77, 78 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (finding that 
these supposed areas of concern include “customer lists, rate structures, manuals, reports, 
proprietary programs, and charges for services”). 
 80. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Pregler v. C&Z, Inc., 575 S.E.2d 915, 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 82. See Phoenix Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez, 439 F. Supp. 2d 510, 521–22 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (referring to nondisclosure agreements generally as “post-employment restraint[s],” and 
refusing to enforce such an agreement that was unreasonable). 
 83. See generally supra Part II.B. 
 84. See Schwan’s Consumer Brands N. Am., Inc. v. Home Run Inn, Inc., Civil No. 05-2763, 
2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 32879, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2005) (refusing to enforce a vague 
nondisclosure agreement that would leave the court to speculate about the confidential or 
proprietary nature of the allegedly proprietary documents); Pregler, 575 S.E.2d at 917 (refusing 
to enforce a nondisclosure by injunction because “[it] lacks sufficient detail to fully apprise [the 
defendant] of which materials may not be used or disclosed” (quoting Sanford v. RDA 
Consultants, Inc., 535 S.E.2d 321, 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000))); Serv. Ctrs. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue, 
535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“By defining confidential information as essentially 
all of the information . . . ‘concerning or in any way relating’ to the services offered by [the 
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whether the employer in fact treated confidential information as 
confidential,85 and some require that employers demonstrate a 
compelling reason for protecting the information.86 Finally, these 
courts expect durational and geographic limits on nondisclosures just 
as they would noncompetes.87 As a general observation, however, 
even though these courts apply the same tests as those applied to 
noncompete agreements, they tend to do so in a somewhat less 
exacting manner.88 
Yet even the jurisdictions placing the most aggressive limits on 
nondisclosures confine their reasonableness inquiry to nondisclosures 
that protect proprietary information not rising to the level of a trade 
secret.89 This limitation implicitly acknowledges that by statutorily 
defining and protecting trade secrets, state legislators have prioritized 
an employer’s property right in certain types of information over the 
unfettered rights of employees to use that information in future 
employment. For the broader, contractually-defined realm of 
proprietary information, however, jurisdictions applying a 
reasonableness inquiry fundamentally recognize that, without some 
 
defendant], the confidentiality agreement amounts in effect to a post-employment covenant not 
to compete which is completely unrestricted in duration or geographical scope.”). 
 85. See Propath Servs. v. Ameripath, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-1912-P, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27846, at *13–20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2004) (fashioning a narrow injunction regarding 
only material that the departing doctor had produced during his tenure with the employer, 
despite concluding the information had not received confidential protection). 
 86. See, e.g., Joseph Chris Pers. Servs., Inc. v. Rossi, Civil Action H-03-2341, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29760, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2005) (applying Wisconsin law to a provision 
baring employees from disclosing former employer’s current or potential clients “serve[d] only 
as a threat to paralyze [the plaintiff’s] workers”); Passalacqua v. Naviant, Inc., 844 So. 2d 792, 
796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to enforce a nondisclosure agreement when the 
employer “did not articulate how any activity, method or technique . . . was unique or 
proprietary in any way”). 
 87. See, e.g., Phoenix Renovation Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d at 521–22 (finding a nondisclosure 
agreement without a geographic limit unenforceable); Sunstates Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. 
Griffin, 449 S.E.2d 858, 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (enforcing a nondisclosure agreement on 
business knowledge because it had a two-year duration). 
 88. See Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Iowa 1999) 
(holding that “[n]ondisclsoure-confidentiality agreements enjoy more favorable treatment in the 
law than do noncompete agreements” yet applying the noncompete test to a nondisclosure 
agreement); see also Lamorte Burns v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1161–68 (N.J. 2001) (engaging in 
a factual evaluation of a nondisclosure agreement’s propriety, but concluding that the employer 
had taken sufficient steps to maintain confidentiality and enforcing the agreement despite some 
evidence to the contrary). 
 89. See Pregler, 575 S.E.2d at 917 (noting that a time limitation is required for a 
nondisclosure agreement to be reasonable unless the information is a trade secret). 
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limits, nondisclosure agreements become no more than unbounded 
and unrestricted restraints on competition. 
2. The Middle Ground: Borrowing the Language—But Not the 
Law—of Noncompete Agreements.  In other jurisdictions, courts 
invoke the general rules from noncompete cases without applying the 
same specific requirements. These courts, either sub silentio or 
explicitly, jettison the more stringent rules that apply to noncompete 
agreements—primarily the prohibition on covenants of unrestricted 
geographic and durational scope. For example, one Virginia court 
declined to enforce a noncompete agreement on the ground that it 
had an uncertain geographic and durational scope.90 In the same case, 
however, it enforced a nondisclosure agreement from the same 
employment contract—also lacking a geographic or time limitation—
on the general bases that it was “no greater than . . . necessary to 
protect the employer’s legitimate business interests, nor [was] it harsh 
and oppressive in preventing the employee from earning a living and 
it [was] not in restraint of trade or violative of public policy.”91 
Another court, in an unusually thorough opinion, concluded that 
the test used for noncompete agreements should be applied to 
nondisclosures, but that “the absence of restrictions concerning time 
or geographic location do not render a [nondisclosure] agreement 
presumptively unenforceable . . . because the inquiry whether the . . . 
agreement unreasonably restricts the employee’s rights would address 
the breadth of the restrictions regarding disclosure.”92 This approach 
creates an awkward middle ground, utilizing two different standards 
that turn on the contractual form rather than the contract’s effects. 
For an employee whose marketable skills in an industry are 
intertwined with supposedly proprietary information, the legal 
distinction may not matter as much as these courts believe. 
 
 90. Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., 60 Va. Cir. 342, 344 (Cir. Ct. 2002). 
 91. Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., 61 Va. Cir. 77, 78 (Cir. Ct. 2003). 
 92. Revere Transducers, 595 N.W.2d at 762; see also Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng’rs, 2001 ME 
17, ¶ 18, 770 A.2d 97, 103–04 (engaging in a reasonableness analysis of a nondisclosure 
agreement but concluding it did not create an undue hardship because the former employee was 
not prevented from “using the general skill and knowledge he [had] acquired during his 
employment”). For a defense of the broad freedom to contract for trade secrets as adopted in 
Bernier, see C. Rachal Pugh, Case Note, Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 231 (2002). 
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3. Unrestrained Enforcement of Nondisclosures.  A third 
approach goes even further, treating nondisclosures as entirely 
unburdened by the restrictions on other postemployment restraints. 
For example, the Tenth Circuit refuses to characterize confidentiality 
and nondisclosure agreements as noncompetes because they “serve 
entirely different purposes than do agreements not to compete and 
must be analyzed on the basis of those distinct purposes alone.”93 
Explicitly rejecting the argument that nondisclosure agreements are 
no more than disguised noncompetes, this approach theoretically 
permits enforcement of nondisclosures even if vague and overly 
broad.94 
Under this approach, a nondisclosure agreement prohibiting 
former employees from using nonsecret proprietary information will 
be enforced regardless of its reasonableness. A substantively identical 
noncompete agreement supported by a protectable business interest 
in proprietary information, meanwhile, will receive judicial scrutiny of 
its geographic and durational limits as well as its impact on the 
employee’s right to work. 
D. Nonrecogition of Proprietary Information 
Some courts avoid the entire debate, flatly refusing to recognize 
proprietary information in one of two circumstances. First, in 
California (and lower courts in several other states), employers may 
only contractually protect information rising to the level of a trade 
secret. Second, in actions between firms (rather than against 
employees), some courts interpret the preemption language of the 
UTSA to bar suits for tortious interference with contract in the 
context of proprietary information. 
1. Refusing to Recognize Proprietary Information on Policy 
Grounds.  One state, California, stands alone in explicitly refusing to 
recognize a distinct category of proprietary information at all. 
California has a statutory prohibition on restraints of trade,95 which 
courts interpret as foreclosing contractual protection for proprietary 
information under both noncompete and nondisclosure agreements. 
 
 93. Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mai Basic 
Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 880 F.2d 286, 288 (10th Cir. 1989)) (applying Colorado law). 
 94. See id. (reversing a district court’s conclusion that a nondisclosure was unenforceable 
because it was vague and overly broad). 
 95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997). 
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The noncompete cases are unified and unequivocal in holding the 
clauses entirely unenforceable. In one case, vacating an injunction 
issued to enforce a nonsolicitation agreement protecting proprietary 
information, a California Court of Appeal noted that California’s 
statutory prohibition against restraints on trade had only a limited 
exception for the misappropriation of trade secrets—an action that, as 
the court notes, would be illegal under the law of unfair competition 
even in the absence of a restrictive employment contract.96 If courts 
permitted further contractual expansion, “[e]mployers could insert 
broad, facially illegal covenants . . . [and m]any, perhaps most, 
employees would honor these clauses without consulting counsel or 
challenging the clause in court.”97 
Lower courts in a few other jurisdictions, particularly New York, 
have suggested in dicta that trade secrets and confidential or 
proprietary information are coextensive. One New York court 
struggled to reconcile two seemingly inconsistent precedents from the 
New York Court of Appeals: In one case, the court plainly stated that 
“[w]here the knowledge does not qualify for protection as a trade 
secret and there has been no . . . commercial piracy we see no reason 
to inhibit the employee’s ability to realize his potential both 
professionally and financially by availing himself of opportunity.”98 In 
another case the same court held that employers had a legitimate 
business interest in the goodwill associated with client relationships, 
which may include proprietary information about the clients.99 The 
court ultimately concluded that the goodwill rule controlled only if 
the plaintiff could show irreparable harm, a standard which was not 
met because the customer lists at issue did not constitute a trade 
secret.100 In addition, because the noncompete agreement had a 
determinate length and thus any resulting harm from its 
nonenforcement would also be limited to that time, the harm was not 
 
 96. Arrowhead Fin. Group v. Welty, No. E032190, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11100, at 
*16–17 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002); see also Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic 
Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577–78 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Business and Professions Code section 
16600 prohibits the enforcement of Metro’s noncompete clause except as is necessary to protect 
trade secrets.”); Esquire Deposition Servs. v. Manus, No. B175370, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 10548, at *15–16 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2004). 
 97. Arrowhead Fin. Group, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11100, at *17 (quoting Kolani v. 
Gluska, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257, 260 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
 98. Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1976). 
 99. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1224–25 (N.Y. 1999). 
 100. Kanan, Corbin, Schupak & Aronow, Inc. v. FD Int’l, Ltd., 797 N.Y.S.2d 883, 889–90 
(Sup. Ct. 2005). 
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irreparable.101 Because the other alternative (a noncompete 
agreement of unlimited durational scope) would likely have been 
unreasonable under New York law,102 this approach effectively denies 
injunctive relief for any confidential information that does not rise to 
the level of a trade secret.103 
Courts in other jurisdictions have flirted with similar rules as 
well.104 Despite these trial and intermediate appellate court holdings, 
however, California stands alone in reliably refusing to recognize a 
separate category of proprietary information. 
2. UTSA Preemption of Proprietary Information.  Under certain 
circumstances, the UTSA itself may bar enforcement of agreements 
protecting proprietary information. This occurs when, rather than 
suing former employees directly,105 companies target competitors who 
 
 101. Id. at 890 (distinguishing the case presented from Johnson Controls, Inc. v. APT 
Critical Systems, 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), in which the indeterminate duration of an 
injury was central to finding irreparability of the harm). 
 102. See, e.g., Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., 497 F. Supp. 462, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (noting that covenants not to compete must be reasonable “both in scope and duration”). 
 103. See Legal Sea Foods, Inc. v. Calise, No. 03 Civ. 4958 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14527, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2003) (holding a noncompete unenforceable under New York 
law because plaintiff restaurant’s recipes and food safety plans were not trade secrets), vacated 
on joint motion by the parties, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Zemco Mfg., Inc. 
v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 239, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Because we have 
held herein that Zemco had no protectable trade secrets, we also hold that there was no damage 
to Zemco from the transfer [of information protected by a non-disclosure agreement].”); 
Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, 754 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (App. Div. 2003) (refusing to grant injunctive 
relief for the breach of a confidentiality agreement when the former employer could not 
demonstrate an explicit breach of the agreement and the information was not a trade secret), 
modified, Marietta Corp. v. Pac. Direct, Inc., 781 N.Y.S.2d 387 (App. Div. 2004); Hair Say, Ltd. 
v. Salon Opus, Inc., No. 5106-01, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 543, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 
2005) (“Hairsay has failed to establish that the customer list is a trade secret leaving 
Defendants, its former employees, free to compete.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 210 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(reviewing Massachusetts decisions and expressing “some doubt about whether and how the 
Massachusetts courts differentiate among confidential information, proprietary information, 
and trade secrets,” but declining to reach the question); Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara, 
244 F. Supp. 2d 977, 989–90 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“The parties concede that under Illinois law, there 
is no apparent functional difference between ‘confidential information’ and ‘trade secrets.’”); 
United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 189, at *14 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2003) (“Trade secrets and confidential information are essentially 
identical concepts.”). The Massachusetts cases are especially surprising, given that state’s 
extremely generous definition of proprietary information under noncompete agreements. See 
supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 105. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 38 (2003) (“Many firms . . . choose not to sue departing 
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have hired a former employee, alleging tortious interference with 
contract. Some courts limit these claims to those involving trade 
secrets, holding that section 7 of the UTSA, which states that the Act 
“displaces conflicting tort . . . law,” preempts suits over mere 
proprietary information.106 
In a suit by a firm against a competitor who had hired a former 
employee bound by a confidentiality agreement, a court considered 
this language as codified107 under Tennessee law.108 The court held that 
the UTSA delineated the outer bounds of the plaintiff’s property 
rights in its proprietary information, concluding that “[i]f the 
information is a trade secret, the plaintiff’s claim is preempted; if not, 
the plaintiff has no legal interest upon which to base his or her claim. 
Either way, the claim is not cognizable.”109 Although the Tennessee 
court is not alone in reaching this result,110 other courts have held that 
claims for tortious interference with contractually-defined proprietary 
information survive adoption of the UTSA.111 In jurisdictions 
adopting the preemption approach, however, an ironic anomaly 
develops: employers remain free to enforce contractual proprietary 
information restrictions against departing employees, but not against 
the firms who hire them and would actually make use of the 
proprietary information. This inconsistency suggests that the 
approach may constitute a sound reading of the statute, but it lacks a 
mooring in fairness or economic efficiency—concerns that, as the next 
 
employees; firms that do sue departing employees are criticized in the industry and have trouble 
recruiting; and firms that sue departing employees . . . rarely accomplish anything by doing 
so.”). 
 106. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005). 
 107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1708(a) (2001). 
 108. Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654–57 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 109. Id. at 657. 
 110. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24894, at 
*23 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2003) (finding a tortious interference claim preempted by Michigan’s 
adoption of the UTSA); Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 643, 
648–49 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that the Illinois Trade Secret Act preempts plaintiff’s tortious 
interference claim because the research and development–related “confidential information” in 
contention fell within the scope of the subject matter covered by the Act), rev’d on other 
grounds, 285 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 111. See, e.g., Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 
652, 659 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“[U]nless it can be clearly discerned that the information in question 
constitutes a trade secret, the Court cannot dismiss alternative theories of relief as preempted 
by the [Virginia codification of the] UTSA.”); Smithfield Ham & Prods. Co. v. Portion Pac, Inc., 
905 F. Supp. 346, 350 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“[Claims for trade secret misappropriation and tortious 
interference] may be wholly independent, indeed in this case they are.”). 
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Part discusses, should play a significant role in informing how courts 
treat proprietary information. 
III.  THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF CATEGORICAL 
PROTECTION FOR PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 
As shown in Part II, courts apply a continuum of approaches to 
defining proprietary information, the broadest of which grants 
employers the freedom to create and enforce broad definitions of 
proprietary information, only sometimes applying lax reasonableness 
restrictions normally imposed on covenants not to compete. Although 
this approach may comport with vague notions of freedom to 
contract, it ignores both the role of substantive fairness in the 
employer-employee bargaining process and the economic 
consequences of casually enforcing such agreements. Scholarly 
literature, considering the problem in the context of trade secrets or 
more general noncompete agreements, suggests that these sorts of 
agreements have high costs. As this Part argues, the possible 
consequences become even more severe when these theories are 
applied to proprietary information. In other words, if trade secret 
protection and narrowly construed restrictive covenants are 
harmful—as commentators suggest—broad protection for proprietary 
information is even worse. 
A. Categorical Protection for Proprietary Information Raises 
Fairness Concerns 
Courts adopting the categorical approach to proprietary 
information generally proceed under the assumption that most 
information can be protected, provided that the resulting restrictions 
qualify as vaguely reasonable. The underlying legal principles, to the 
extent the courts identify them, most often rest on invocation of 
contract theory or consent-based principles.112 As the argument goes, 
nondisclosure and noncompete agreements signify an employer’s 
willingness to hire a prospective employee only if secure that the 
employee will not take its proprietary information and use it in the 
service of a competitor. Prospective employees, meanwhile, 
 
 112. See Stone, supra note 2, at 739–40 (“When an employment relationship includes a 
covenant not to compete or not to disclose specific information, it is reasonable to assume that 
the employee has consented to restrictions on his or her post-employment activities. 
Accordingly, there is a strong argument for courts to enforce the covenant . . . .”). 
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voluntarily accept these restrictions as conditions of their new 
employment. In an efficiently functioning market, the employees 
would theoretically receive higher compensation to offset their 
decreased mobility and marketability. Under these principles, courts 
are inclined to enforce employment contracts, barring some 
particularly striking public policy concern.113 
These contract-oriented arguments encounter several difficulties. 
Most simplistically, as courts and commentators often note, 
bargaining power is rarely equal at the commencement of 
employment and, especially with the use of restrictive covenants so 
widespread in certain industries, employees frequently have little 
choice but to accept these terms of employment.114 
In the realm of proprietary information, one must also question 
whether these contracts truly reflect informed consent. Employees 
sign most confidentiality and noncompete agreements at the 
commencement of employment.115 At that juncture, employers know 
the content of the proprietary information they hope the agreement 
will cover. Yet if the firm discloses the actual information to 
employees before they sign an agreement, the information will lose its 
valuable status because the prospective employee would have the 
information but not yet be bound by contract. An information 
asymmetry results: the firm has far more information about what 
knowledge will be restricted than the employee does.116 
This information asymmetry suggests not only unfairness during 
the bargaining process but also that employees who sign such 
contracts do not receive higher compensation in return for agreeing 
not to depart with knowledge they acquire during their tenure. 
Employees are compensated in two ways: first with money, and 
second with knowledge and skills that will increase their potential for 
 
 113. 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 197 (2d ed. 1999) (“[T]he cases 
invoke public policy to alter pure contract doctrine. . . . [N]onetheless, contract issues underlie 
all questions of interpreting restrictive covenants.”). 
 114. See id. at 195 (noting that “[t]he typical inequality of the parties in bargaining power is 
one important distinction” between restrictive covenants involving employees and those used in 
the sale of a business). 
 115. In fact, employment agreements signed after the commencement of at-will employment 
are sometimes held unenforceable for lack of consideration. See supra note 78 and 
accompanying text. 
 116. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 
393–94 (1993) (recognizing information asymmetry in employee-employer negotiations). 
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better future employment.117 An employee may thus rationally 
sacrifice knowledge for proportionally higher compensation.118 
When firms write contracts defining proprietary information 
vaguely, employees have no way of knowing the degree of future 
marketability that they have contracted away, and this ability to 
alienate their human capital is lost. Firms, meanwhile, have a strong 
incentive to downplay the significance of the proprietary information 
restriction to prospective employees, because the less the perceived 
degree of the restriction, the less compensation prospective 
employees will accept.119 
Trade secret law helps address this problem by providing default 
rules.120 The UTSA and the case law developed under it have 
delineated the scope and meaning of a trade secret, and both 
employee and employer therefore have at least some concept of what 
may be included before employment commences.121 But no such 
default rules exist for proprietary information, and an inefficient 
labor market results. 
The categorical approach exacerbates these problems. As the 
case law demonstrates, many courts will enforce nondisclosure and 
noncompete agreements protecting completely unspecified 
proprietary information. Some will not even require that the exact 
nature of the proprietary information be identified at trial.122 Such 
enforcement encourages broad overreaching by employers. Firms can 
safely require new employees to sign away their rights to a world of 
knowledge they do not yet grasp, knowing that if the employee ever 
 
 117. See Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach to the 
Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 313 (1998) (discussing how 
an employees’ skills can add to their value on the labor market beyond the value of the trade 
secrets they possess). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the 
Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (2002) (“[Some] 
explanations [of contracting parties leaving verifiable factors unexploited] suggest that, when 
information is asymmetric between the parties, the better-informed party may refrain from 
proposing a more complete contract because, in doing so, she may communicate private 
information to the other party and thereby compromise her share of the contracting surplus.”). 
 120. See Nathan Newman, Trade Secrets and Collective Bargaining: A Solution to Resolving 
Tensions in the Economics of Innovation, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 3–4 (2002) 
(characterizing trade secret law as a set of default rules alternative to covenants not to 
compete). 
 121. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
04__MONTVILLE.DOC 3/9/2007  7:48 AM 
1190 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1159 
leaves to join a competing firm, most courts will find something in the 
employee’s head that appears, at least on the surface, confidential and 
proprietary even though courts would be mistaken to hold that the 
employer has an absolute property right over the information.123 
The categorical approach also violates what Professor Katherine 
Stone refers to as the “new psychological employment contract.”124 
Stone observes that in recent years, educated employees and blue-
collar workers alike find themselves in high mobility job markets.125 
As a result, Stone argues, employees today are motivated not by 
guarantees of secure, long-term employment and generous retirement 
plans, but rather by promises that their “human capital” will be 
enhanced through training and experience, while their “social capital” 
is built through networking opportunities with other departments, 
vendors, and customers.126 She suggests that when firms use 
restrictions on knowledge sharing to forbid departing employees from 
taking the human and social capital with them, employers violate this 
implicit employment contract.127 
One might criticize Stone’s theory on the basis that an explicit 
written employment contract—a nondisclosure or noncompete 
agreement—should trump this implicit contract because it represents 
more accurately the shared understanding between firm and 
employee. But when proprietary information is vaguely defined and 
 
 123. Some courts hold that firms have a property right in trade secrets. Most prominently, in 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed this issue in a 
takings claim by a pesticide manufacturer. The manufacturer claimed that the disclosure of 
secret health, safety, and environmental data to the Environmental Protection Agency 
constituted a taking. Id. at 998–99. The Court held that because state trade secret law had 
created a protectable property interest in the data, it qualified as property for the purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1012. The Court emphasized that “the extent of the property 
right . . . is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from 
disclosure to others.” Id. at 1001. 
When applied to proprietary information, this reasoning holds little sway, however. In 
Monsanto, the court held that a property right existed because of expectations that were created 
by state law. In proprietary information cases, meanwhile, it is the employer defining the scope 
of the property right, purely through contract and only against a single employee. To say that 
state enforcement of the employment contract creates a property right would begin a circular 
and conceptually unlimited definition of protectable knowledge as property, especially when 
most employment agreements are so vague that anything can be protected. 
 124. See Stone, supra note 2, at 731 (“The academic literature about the new psychological 
contract tries to characterize the new set of expectations that managers impart to their 
employees . . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 727–28. 
 126. Id. at 735–36. 
 127. Id. at 763. 
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employees commence employment with no substantive knowledge of 
the scope and subject matter encompassed by the phrase “proprietary 
information,” the restrictive covenant abrogates the new 
psychological employment contract without the employee’s knowing 
consent. 
This argument applies with particular strength to the realm of 
proprietary information. Consider, for example, a sales representative 
in a typical customer information case who signed a restrictive 
covenant at the commencement of a long term of employment. After 
years of employment, most of the increase in her human capital will 
be in the form of familiarity with the requirements and whims of the 
potential customers who live within her geographic region. Enforcing 
a restrictive covenant that stipulates such (nonsecret) information as 
confidential and proprietary leaves her with neither the implicit 
contract of secure long-term employment from the earlier era or 
today’s implicit promise of training and career development. 
B. Broad Controls on Proprietary Information Increase Transaction 
Costs and Threaten Economic Growth 
Although few commentators have directly addressed the 
economic consequences of protecting proprietary information, a 
number of arguments are consistently advanced to justify general 
protections of trade secrets and restraints of human capital through 
noncompetes. On their surface, these arguments also seem to form an 
appealing rationale for enforcing broader protections of proprietary 
information. These arguments are subject to extensive criticism, 
however, especially when applied to the unique characteristics of 
proprietary information as enforced by most courts. 
In evaluating the economic justifications for enforcing 
restrictions on proprietary information, one must inquire not about 
whether trade-secret-like information in general should be protected, 
but rather whether explicit justifications exist for contractually 
protecting information that falls outside the statutory scope of trade 
secrets. The pivotal question becomes, what information should 
acquire a legally protected status simply because an employer has 
designated it confidential or proprietary in agreements with 
employees who, in most cases, have not yet been exposed to the 
information they have promised not to disclose?128 
 
 128. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
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1. Categorical Protection for Proprietary Information is 
Economically Unnecessary and Has Anticompetitive Effects.  The first 
common argument for protection proposes that strict protections are 
necessary to encourage the creation of valuable information despite 
the public goods problem129 associated with informational goods.130 
Because many types of knowledge require investment to collect or 
produce, innovators need assurances that they can recoup their 
investment by profiting in the market. If the information flows out of 
the firm through former employees, competitors will be able to 
underprice information producers and eliminate their ability to 
recoup an initial investment, thus destroying any incentive to engage 
in such investment in the future. This classic rationale forms the basis 
for the limited monopolies granted by both the copyright and patent 
regimes, and is frequently mentioned in support of trade secret law as 
well.131 
A number of scholars have criticized this reasoning as applied to 
trade secrets, notably Professors Edmund Kitch and Alan Hyde. 
Kitch argues that several self-protecting characteristics of valuable 
information make additional contractual protection unnecessary. 
First, he maintains that “valuable information” is difficult to steal 
because it only exists in unorganized and difficult-to-appropriate 
forms.132 Second, information that is not subject to patent or copyright 
protection generally has a high depreciation rate.133 Third, he argues 
that markets are organized specifically to transmit information such 
as pricing, so firms mutually benefit from the flow of this data and it 
will quickly be disclosed even when legally restricted.134 
These arguments demonstrate why proprietary information 
requires only minimal legal protection, because the subject matter of 
 
 129. The public goods problem arises from two unique aspects of information: it is 
nonrivalrous (an unlimited number of firms can utilize the information simultaneously) and 
nonexcludable (it is difficult to prevent others from using the information in the absence of legal 
or physical protections). See HYDE, supra note 105, at 46 (explaining the public goods problem); 
Bone, supra note 6, at 262–63 (same). 
 130. Unikel, supra note 28, at 846–47; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics 
of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 708–09 (1980) (sketching out the 
conventional welfare analysis applied to contractual protections of valuable information). 
 131. See Bone, supra note 6, at 262 (“The incentive-based argument is one of the most 
frequently invoked in the trade secret literature today.”). 
 132. Kitch, supra note 130, at 711–12. 
 133. Id. at 713. 
 134. See id. at 716–20 (detailing the principle of information communication through the 
price mechanism). 
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proprietary information, even more than trade secrets, tends to 
depreciate at a particularly high rate. Business methods and 
marketing models, by their very nature, inevitably become public as 
firms interact with suppliers and customers. Customer lists face a 
similar temporal limitation, because in most industries customers do 
not have a permanent relationship with a single vendor, and 
competing firms may identify and market to those customers in other 
ways. Finally, pricing data, another common form of proprietary 
information, becomes public as the market functions normally. 
Accordingly, liberal protections of proprietary information 
provide few direct benefits for firms. Significantly, Kitch’s 
observations are even more valid today than in 1980 because as the 
rates of product and business development continue to increase, 
information becomes valueless ever more quickly,135 and nonsecret 
information such as the supposedly proprietary information 
commonly at stake in litigation loses its valuable status particularly 
quickly as it becomes widely known. 
So if much of proprietary information requires no legal 
protection, why do firms litigate to enforce vague nondisclosures and 
noncompetes? The answer likely lies in the anticompetitive nature of 
these agreements. In many of the categorical approach cases, a 
common theme repeats: the information at stake is neither 
particularly secret, nor particularly valuable to competitors. Firms’ 
actual rationales for suing to enforce the employment agreements are 
often to prevent a direct competitor from entering their markets. The 
proprietary information supposedly at the crux of the litigation simply 
provides a rationale for accomplishing that goal. 
A special line of criticism applies to the protection of pricing 
information and cost formulas. This information will often fail to 
qualify for trade secret protection because it must necessarily be 
revealed to current and potential customers, yet courts will often 
consider it a legitimate business interest.136 Allowing employers to 
protect this sort of information has particularly significant costs. Free 
 
 135. See Jack E. Karns & Roger P. McIntyre, Are Intellectual Property Rights Protected in 
Employment Contract Covenants Not to Compete Given the Rapid Rate of New Product 
Development?, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 631, 644–46 (2001) (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
skepticism that a one-year noncompete agreement protecting proprietary information was 
necessary in the Internet information technology industry, and advising technology firms to 
make sparing use of narrowly drafted employment agreements). 
 136. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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dissemination of pricing information forms the basis of perfect 
competition and creates an essential foundation of an efficiently 
functioning market.137 Whereas an employer who occupies a 
semimonopolistic position in a particular market may indeed be 
harmed if potential competitors undercut its pricing, firms are free to 
compete by reducing pricing rather than restraining former 
employees from competing. Costs to consumers are thus reduced, and 
firms must innovate rather than simply restrain competition by taking 
advantage of informational asymmetries in the market. 
2. Broad Protection for Proprietary Information May Impede 
Innovation.  Whereas Kitch explains why protections for proprietary 
information are unnecessary, Professor Hyde’s theories suggest that 
eliminating them might actually spur innovation. In his analysis of the 
information economics of high velocity labor markets, Hyde argues 
that the information spillover associated with high employee mobility 
and nonenforcement of restrictive covenants and trade secrets 
actually has economic benefits for employers and employees alike.138 
Hyde builds on Professor AnnaLee Saxenian’s observations that the 
Silicon Valley region, where employee mobility is high and restrictive 
covenants and trade secret laws are rarely enforced, consistently 
outperforms the high-tech Massachusetts Route 128 corridor of 
vertically integrated, low-turnover firms.139 
To explain the disparity in economic terms, Hyde argues that the 
Silicon Valley experience demonstrates that as the engine of 
economic growth, information actually becomes more valuable when 
widely shared, and even if companies cannot fully maximize their 
returns, they will nevertheless continue to produce valuable 
information because even information known by competitors still 
creates returns greater than the marginal cost of production.140 
It follows that the less a firm initially invests in valuable 
information, the less of a marginal return it needs to justify the 
investment despite its dissemination to other firms. Proprietary 
 
 137. See ALAN GILPIN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC TERMS 166 (3d ed. 1973) (identifying 
“[c]omplete knowledge, [that is,] each buyer knowing what price is being asked for a particular 
commodity in every part of the market,” as a key demand-side factor required for markets 
approaching perfect competition (emphasis omitted)). 
 138. HYDE, supra note 105, at 55–60. 
 139. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 1–4 (1994). 
 140. HYDE, supra note 105, at 50–51. 
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information, especially the sorts of proprietary information that do 
not qualify for trade secret protection, falls among the least valuable 
of legally protectable knowledge and is thus the least worthy of legal 
protection, for most proprietary information is so relatively valueless 
that firms have not endeavored to keep it truly secret. Furthermore, 
the most common sorts of proprietary information—customer lists, 
business models, and pricing information141—exist entirely by virtue of 
participation in a functioning market and do not necessarily represent 
any independent investment at all. If legal enforcement of 
proprietary-information-protecting contracts were reduced, firms 
would continue to produce this sort of information, and the market as 
a whole would benefit from its wider dissemination as firms improved 
on each other’s work. 
Hyde’s analysis also provides a useful economic counterpoint to 
the corporate morality justifications for enforcing wide restrictions on 
proprietary information.142 Hyde, considering the “human capital 
market,” observes that companies who build their business on the 
information they “purchased” by hiring experienced employees but 
then attempt to restrict outgoing information with noncompete or 
nondisclosure agreements are free riding on the work of their 
competitors.143 Accordingly, a narrow definition of proprietary 
information would benefit not only departing employees but also 
entire industries. Through careful interpretation of employment 
agreements, courts can place substantive limits on free riding by 
limiting information hoarding to situations in which a firm clearly 
identifies its proprietary information and provides concrete 
justifications for secrecy rather than using courts to enforce post facto 
restraints on trade. 
3. A Broad Definition of Proprietary Information Increases 
Transaction Costs and Reduces Employee Compliance.  Advocates of 
heightened protection sometimes suggest that contractual restrictions 
on proprietary information reduce certain kinds of transaction costs. 
As the argument goes, in the absence of legally enforceable 
restrictions, employers will be forced to resort to expensive and 
 
 141. See supra Part II.A. 
 142. See generally Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. 
REV. 1076 (1988) (discussing corporate ethics in the context of trade secret theft). 
 143. HYDE, supra note 105, at 68. 
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inefficient methods of physically controlling valuable information.144 
Because employers would be forced to carefully limit dissemination 
of information to a few select employees, widespread productivity 
would consequently be diminished.145 
Other sorts of transaction costs increase, however, when broad 
contractual protection of proprietary information is permitted. 
Because every contract takes a unique and often very broad form, 
litigation over proprietary information is highly unpredictable, 
making settlement less likely and increasing litigation costs. 
Furthermore, although the case law surrounding statutory trade 
secrets cannot be fairly characterized as lucid,146 it certainly appears 
more cohesive, or at least more extensively analyzed, than the 
common law in suits over proprietary information discussed in Part 
II. 
In addition, employees subject to these agreements have little 
idea of what materials are actually protected. In an empirical study of 
Silicon Valley employee attitudes towards trade secrets, Professor 
Yuval Feldman found that broad trade secret laws have little 
deterrent effect because employees are unaware of what information 
is covered and do not believe they will actually be sued.147 With ad 
hoc, unevenly enforced contractual provisions on proprietary 
information, it follows that there is even greater ambiguity and even 
less deterrent effect. In addition, broad and vague contractual 
restrictions increase a firm’s motivation to engage in costly frivolous 
lawsuits specifically designed to restrain former employees from 
competing.148 
IV.  MINIMIZING THE COSTS OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 
Considering the economic and fairness concerns raised in Part III 
regarding the broad enforcement of proprietary information, this Part 
 
 144. See David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 
61, 67–69 (1991) (arguing that trade secret law reduces transaction costs). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Bone, supra note 6, at 279 (“[T]rade secret law is replete with open-ended 
standards and vague balancing criteria . . . .”). 
 147. Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures: Divulging 
of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 105, 140 
(empirically observing that the ambiguity in the legal definition of trade secrets reduces the 
likelihood of formal enforcement). 
 148. Bone, supra note 6, at 279. 
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argues that more minimal protections will better serve both firms and 
their workers. At the same time, this Part implicitly recognizes that 
the freedom to contractually protect valuable information is well 
established in the common law and perhaps sometimes economically 
beneficial. Accordingly, rather than advocate a California-like rule,149 
this Part proposes a more modest and feasible approach. 
First, courts in all states should adopt the fact-intensive 
specificity approach, requiring employment contracts to identify 
precisely what kinds of information are considered proprietary and 
employers to show at trial that employees actually possessed this 
information. Courts should refuse to enforce employment contracts 
with vague definitions of proprietary information or that contain 
restrictions unnecessary to actually protect such information. Second, 
courts should apply the same standards used for noncompete 
agreements to nondisclosure agreements, especially when employers 
ask for injunctive relief that might limit employee mobility. Together, 
these requirements will ameliorate some of the fairness concerns and 
economic costs of protecting proprietary information without 
drastically upsetting the established doctrine. 
A. Requiring Specificity and Reasonableness Would Make Employer-
Employee Contracting More Fair 
Universal adoption of the strict specificity requirement for 
agreements protecting proprietary information, coupled with 
stringent application of the rule of reason to nondisclosure 
agreements, would help mediate the fairness concerns associated with 
these covenants. When employment agreements must identify 
precisely what proprietary information forms the foundation of a 
noncompete agreement or nondisclosure agreement, employees gain 
at least some understanding of what future knowledge they bargain 
away and are able to place an economic value on that knowledge. It 
also becomes easier for firms to reach pareto efficient results—in 
terms of increased compensation to offset the knowledge the 
employee relinquishes—when both sides know the subject of their 
bargaining is. Such a requirement would also prevent employers from 
taking advantage of their position by changing their end of the 
bargain and expanding restrictions on the employee during 
employment, for example, through such nominal steps as stamping 
 
 149. See supra Part II.D.1. 
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the word “confidential” on a document.150 Finally, limiting 
enforcement of employment agreements to those specifying precise 
and narrow types of knowledge would give employees some 
awareness of which aspects of Stone’s new psychological contract151 
their new employer will not fulfill. This solution is far from ideal—for 
example, even when employees know what information qualifies as 
proprietary, they may not appreciate its economic value until they 
have been employed in the industry for some period of time—but it 
does represent an improvement over completely unbounded 
contracts. 
B. A Specificity Requirement Would Temper the Negative Economic 
Effects of Proprietary Information 
Requiring specificity and a factual reasonableness inquiry of all 
contracts restraining employee use of proprietary information 
addresses Kitch and Hyde’s observations about the nature of valuable 
information.152 First, a heightened specificity requirement will ferret 
out the least valuable proprietary information—the sort that Kitch 
suggests will most frequently protect itself. The reasonableness 
inquiry, meanwhile, allows courts to decline enforcing agreements 
that use proprietary information as a guise for restraining legitimate 
competition. In addition, by requiring employers to identify their 
intent to restrict such information at the onset of employment, courts 
can move toward applying a proper public welfare analysis to 
contracts with potentially wide-ranging negative consequences, 
leading to the development of brighter-line rules in crucial areas such 
as pricing and customer information.153 
The proposed approach will also increase informational 
spillover154 by protecting less information, resulting in benefits for 
firm research and development, particularly by requiring durationally 
limited nondisclosure agreements that protect non–trade-secret 
information. It will likewise decrease the information hoarding that 
occurs when large employers tie their employees to noncompete and 
 
 150. See supra note 67. 
 151. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra Part III.B. 
 153. Some states have already done this with regard to customer lists. See supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text. 
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broad nondisclosure agreements by limiting protection to specifically-
identified information. 
C. Heightened Specificity Will Increase Compliance and Lower 
Transaction Costs 
By requiring employers to specify at the commencement of 
employment the exact scope of the knowledge being contractually 
protected, these sorts of transaction costs may also be tempered. 
Litigation would become more predictable as courts moved toward a 
cohesive body of case law delineating which categories are 
protectable and which categories are not. Compliance would also 
increase as employees would be better able to comply with 
nondisclosure agreements having a reasonable, well-defined scope. 
Moreover, as Feldman suggests, they would be more inclined to 
comply with the knowledge that courts would enforce certain types of 
employment agreements.155 As a result, litigation resulting from 
employee noncompliance would decrease. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the increasing significance and incidence of 
postemployment restraints on proprietary and confidential 
information, few courts have explicitly addressed the existence of this 
category of information. Even fewer have taken any steps toward a 
consistent doctrine for interpreting such agreements, and some fail to 
even identify precisely what information forms the basis of an 
injunction. 
This broad approach encourages overreaching by employers, 
impedes the fair negotiation of employment agreements, increases 
transaction costs, harms employee compliance, and threatens 
economic growth. With these concerns in mind, courts should require 
those employment agreements purporting to protect proprietary 
information to narrowly specify exactly what interests are at issue. 
Recognizing that nondisclosure agreements often have the same 
effect as noncompete agreements, they should also consistently apply 
rules of reason. When employers overreach by relying on the vague 
rubric of “confidential or proprietary information” to unreasonably 
 
 155. See Feldman, supra note 147 (demonstrating that employee compliance corresponds to 
perceptions of enforceability). 
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impede employee mobility, courts should refuse to enforce these 
agreements to the benefit of both employees and the market at large. 
